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UNITED STATES OIL IMPORTS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
HELMUT J. FRANK* and DONALD A. WELL **

A major problem confronting the American economy during the
remainder of the 1970's is a shortage of primary energy sources. The
energy shortage, which has emerged during the past two years, is
expected to become much more severe in coming years. John G.
McLean, chairman of Continental Oil Company and chairman of
the National Petroleum Council's Committee on U.S. Energy Outlook, has warned that imports of crude oil will precipate a large and
growing deficit in the United States' balance of trade in fuels; and the
deficit could amount to as much as $25 billion by the early 1980's, as
compared with a current deficit of less than $3 billion.1 The Chase
Manhattan Bank has indicated that "the annual balance of payments
deficit for petroleum alone could be as much as 25 billion dollars" by
1985,2 a figure which corresponds to what is generally considered the
most likely of the four estimates of the National Petroleum Council
(Case Ii).3
The U.S. has experienced substantial balance of payments deficits
in recent years. In 1971, on an official settlements basis, the U.S.
international accounts recorded a deficit of $29.8 billion, and the
dollar had to be devalued for the first time since 1934. Subsequent
devaluations and the weakness of the dollar in international markets
have resulted from continuing deficits. Obviously, increased import
bills for oil (and gas) in the future will make it more difficult for the
U.S. to establish balance in its international payments and receipts; if
the magnitudes expressed above are realized, the balance of payments
position of the U.S. might become untenable. Certainly substantial
increases in imports of petroleum could undermine programs initiated
to shore up the value of the dollar.
In this article we examine the background of the energy shortage,
give projections of future import requirements by 1980, estimate the
cost of these imports, examine their probable impact on the U.S.
international payments position, and discuss some of the balance of
payments adjustment mechanisms designed to cope with this impact.
'Professor of Economics, University of Arizona.
'*Professor of Economics, University of Arizona.
1. Remarks by McLean, The United States Energy Outlook and Its Implicationsfor Western
Europe, at American Chamber of Commerce, London, England (July 13, 1972).
2. Winger, Outlook for Energy in the United States to 1985, at 51, (Energy Economics
Division, The Chase Manhattan Bank (1972).

3. National Petroleum Council's Committee on U.S. Energy Outlook, Report, U.S. Energy
Outlook 298 (1972).
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We emphasize two questions: (a) whether an oil import bill of $25
billion in 1985, or an equivalent bill of around $18 billion in
1980, 4 measures the true balance of payments impact of future oil
imports; and (b) whether, and how, the American economy will be
able to cope with the cost of such a greatly increased volume of oil
imports.
U.S. ENERGY PROSPECTS FOR 1980
Energy Balances
5
The projections published by the National Petroleum Council will
conveniently illustrate the consensus forecast of U.S. energy supply
and demand for 1980. Other recent projections contain slightly
different numbers for energy demand and the various components of
supply. The orders of magnitude, however, are quite similar and the
qualitative discussion would not be affected. The salient features are
the following:
Primary energy demand is expected to increase at a compound
annual rate of 4.2%, to a total of 102.6 quadrillion (1015) BTU's from
67.8 BTUxl0 15 in 1970.
Total domestic supply will expand, but only at a rate of 2.5% per
year, from 59.4 BTUxlO15 to 76.2 BTUxl015 .
15
Import requirements consequently will rise from 8.4 BTUxlO to
5
26.4 BTUx101 , i.e., they will triple. The share of imports will
increase from 12.4% to 26% of total U.S. energy supply.
The major reason for the widening gap is the limited domestic
supply of the two largest energy sources, oil and gas, at present prices.
Together these account for over 75% of total primary energy sources.
Domestic production of natural gas is currently at or very close to a
peak, under current economic and operating conditions, and is
expected to fall by some 13% by 1980. Some synthetic gas will be
produced, chiefly in naphtha reforming plants and perhaps also from
coal, but the volumes by 1980 will still be modest and will only
permit total domestic gas supplies to remain at the 1970 level. This
will occur at a time when demand for gas continues to increase
rapidly because of its superior quality as a clean fuel and its attractive
price (held down by federal regulation).
Domestic production of petroleum liquids (crude and natural gas
4. We concentrate on 1980 because the options for changing energy demand or the
availability of energy supplies are very limited over this time period. Policy decisions taken in
the near term, however, could influence substantially the level of oil imports, and hence balance
of payments projections, for 1985.
5. National Petroleum Council, supra note 3. We use the "intermediate case" for demand
increases and Case III, which assumes low finding and medium drilling rates, for supply
projections.
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liquids) is expected to expand less than 3% by 1980. This increase,
however, will only be achieved if oil from the Alaskan North Slope is
available at the full capacity of the Alaska pipeline (2.4 million
barrels per day). Supplies from existing U.S. sources are projected as
falling by 19% from 1970. No substantial contribution from synthetic
liquids (shale, tar sands, or coal liquefaction) is anticipated by 1980.
Constraints imposed by technology, price-cost relationships, large
capital investments, and long lead times make a reversal of the
prospects for 1980 highly unlikely. Given sufficient time, of course,
additional options can be developed. Higher prices would tend to
stimulate production of oil and gas from conventional sources, though
precise magnitude and timing of responses are not known. Technological breakthroughs, in time, would permit large-scale application
of new sources and technologies such as breeder reactors, controlled nuclear fusion, or solar energy. Also, as existing sources of
energy in natural form become increasingly scarce their prices tend to
rise, bringing the commercial application of new energy forms closer.
But even strong governmental support for these new sources will
hardly permit them to play a role much before the mid-1980's, if then.
Relief from much greater reliance on imports is thus unlikely, in the
absence of such unrealistic possibilities as severe rationing of energy
or removal of environmental constraints on energy production,
transportation and utilization, or of very steep price increases.
Volume of Oil Imports
Somewhat larger imports of gas in various forms are anticipated by
1980-3.75 trillion cubic feet compared with 0.8 TCF in 1970. But
this would permit total gas supplies from all sources (domestic plus
imports, natural plus synthetic) to increase only modestly (13%)
during the decade. The potential contribution of imports is quite
limited. Increased pipeline movements depend on availability of
surpluses in Canada beyond that country's own long-range
requirements, which are very conservatively estimated. A contribution from new regions, such as the Canadian Arctic, is not likely
before 1980. Imports from overseas require liquefaction at the source
and transportation in specialized methane tankers at very low
temperatures. This raises the cost to two or three times that of natural
gas and is likely to keep the volumes shipped quite limited.
The primary emphasis will thus be on importation of oil. In
contrast to gas, oil is currently available in abundance from a variety
of overseas sources, and at a cost below that of domestic oil. In the
Middle East alone, proved reserves at the beginning of 1973
amounted to 356 billion barrels, two-thirds of Free World reserves
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(excluding the United States) and equivalent to about 55 years' supply
at the current production rate. 6 Other sizeable reserves exist in North
and West Africa, and Indonesia. Together, these could support any
likely demands which the United States may make on them in 1980
and beyond (in addition to the Eastern Hemisphere's own
requirements).
Current estimates of supplies available from Western Hemisphere
sources are much more modest. No really major new discoveries have
been made in established producing areas of Western Canada in two
decades and production is approaching capacity. Further expansion
will then depend on sufficient reserves being established in the
frontier areas (the Arctic and Offshore regions), but again these
probably would not be available until after 1980. Some increase in the
contribution of synthetic crude recovered from Canadian tar sands (in
the Athabasca area of Alberta) is likely, although the first plant is still
incurring losses after four years of operation.
Prospects for increased supplies from Latin America are even
bleaker. Reserves in the major exporting country, Venezuela, have
been static and production has recently been falling, chiefly due to
high costs caused by increased taxation. Rising internal demands
within Latin America are expected to reduce the area's export
potential in coming years. Sizeable supplies of synthetic oil could be
developed only in the Orinoco Tar Belt in Venezuela, which could
potentially yield a crude of heavy fuel oil quality particularly suitable
for direct burning in U.S. power plants, especially on the East Coast.
The remaining deficit would have to be met by imports from
Eastern Hemisphere sources. Based on the assumptions explained
above, this would amount to 7.6 million barrels per day in 1980. Total
oil imports would constitute nearly half (48%) of total oil supply, with
Eastern Hemisphere amounting to over one-third of the total. The
contrast with assessments made a scant three years ago is striking. 7
Projected balances for 1980 and comparisons with 1970 are shown in
the following table.
Cost of Oil Imports
The posted price of a typical Middle East crude, in the Persian
Gulf, such as Arabian 340 was $2.591 per barrel, f.o.b. Ras Tanura, in
6. 70 The Oil and Gas J. 82-83 (1972). The N.P.C. Oil Supply Task Group believes these
estimates to include both proved and probable reserves and suggests a range of 230-275 billion
for proved reserves only. See 2 National Petroleum Council, U.S. Energy Outlook, An Initial
Appraisal, 1971-1985 (1971).
7. The Cabinet Task Force on Oil Imports, with a strongly pro-free-trade majority, implied
in 1969 that imports from Eastern Hemisphere sources should be limited to 10% of total supply
for national security reasons,
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TABLE 1
U.S. Petroleuma Supply-Demand Balance, 1970 and 1980
(million barrels per day)

Estimated Requirement
U.S. Production
Established areas
Alaska North Slope
Total
Required Imports from:
Canada
Latin America
Eastern Hemisphere
a.
b.
c.
d.

1970

1980

14.7

22.3

11.3
11.3

9.2
2.4
b
11.7

3.4
0.7
2.1
0.6

10.6
1.1c
1.9 c
7 .6 d

Crude plus natural gas liquids.
Includes 0.1 syncrude from shale.
Quantity available for net export.
Residual figure.

Source: National Petroleum Council, U.S. Energy Outlook, pp. 61 and 262.

January 1973. Adding tanker transportation at an appropriate rate
(World Scale 70) of $1.02 per barrel yields a landed price at the U.S.
East Coast, ex-duty, of $3.61 per barrel. This is about 10% below the
cost of comparable domestic crudes (around $4.00 a barrel). Import
prices at the West and Gulf Coasts would be very similar, although
domestic prices would be lower because of transportation savings.
For determining the balance of payments impact of oil imports,
however, the use of posted prices is not appropriate. Nor can one use
the current figures to represent future costs of imports, since costs and
prices of foreign crudes are on a rising trend, which is unlikely to be
halted in the near future. The use of economic (resource) costs in
estimating future oil prices is also misleading. This is based on the
assumption that prices tend, in the long run, to approach a
competitive equilibrium representing economic costs, including a
competitive rate of return on capital (appropriate for the risks
involved). Any margin above such costs is considered to be the result
of temporary frictions, which tend to disappear once market forces
have sufficient time to exert their full force. It is particularly
important, in this context, to be clear on the nature of economic rent.
This is a form of income that, by definition, is not required to draw
out needed supply. Competition could, therefore, drive down price
until all rent is eliminated, without impairing production.
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This concept was advanced until very recently as appropriate to
forecasting future world oil prices. 8 During the past two years,
however, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), which controls some 90% of Free World exports, has become
a most effective force in controlling world oil prices. It has been able
to: raise posted prices, on which tax calculations are based; schedule
further increases to 1975; raise the governments' share of total profits;
increase prices to compensate for devaluation of the U.S. dollar; and
obtain government participation in producing operations, 9 with
prospect of majority control by 1982. All available evidence points to
a further increase in the strength of the producing countries, vis-a-vis
the Western consuming countries, in coming years.
The relevant concept for determining the future cost of Middle
East crude oil to Western oil companies is two-fold: (a) the total cost
to the oil companies of producing foreign crude, which includes
resource costs plus government payments (tax-paid cost), and (b) the
cost at which the companies will be able to buy back crude oil
accruing to the producing countries under participation agreements,
but which are sold through commercial channels because of the
inability of most government companies to market sufficient volumes
of oil directly. 10
To this concept must be added the cost of transporting the oil to
U.S. ports. This presumably will be done by the most economical
means available, very large tankers (VLCC's) of 200,000 DWT or
more. Virtually all of these ships are foreign flag vessels because of
lower construction and operating costs. Currently there are no ports
along the U.S. East Coast or Gulf Coast which can accommodate
these ships, but plans to develop several are well advanced. Also,
adjacent locations (e.g., Canada, Puerto Rico or the Bahamas) may
serve as transshipment points for import to the East Coast.
We have estimated the cost of U.S. crude imports for 1980 on the
following specific assumptions:
1. Posted prices will be increased by 7% following the currency
realignment of early 1973. This assumes an average dollar devaluation
of 9% and application of the Geneva formula.1 1
8. See e.g., M. Adehnan, The World Petroleum Market 262 (1972).
9. Iran is not insisting on the participation concept, on the ground that the oil is already
owned by the nation under the existing agreement with the Consortium of foreign oil
companies, but it has achieved other important concessions instead from the members of the
Consortium.
10. Profits earned on crude oil exported to the United States should not be included, for
balance of payments purposes, if one assumes that shipments will be handled by American
companies and that earnings will be remitted to U.S. parents.
11. The Oil Daily, Feb. 27, 1973.
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2. Thereafter posted prices will increase until 1975 in line with
existing agreements, i.e., by 2.5% plus 5¢ per barrel per year.
3. Between 1975 and 1980, posted prices will rise at the same rate
as the average increase in the price of manufactured goods in world
trade, assumed to run 5% per year. 12
4. Production costs of 13¢/bbl., the figure currently reported for
Saudi Arabia, are representative for the Persian Gulf area and will not
change significantly.
5. Royalty and tax payments to the host governments will be
determined as at present, i.e., royalty at 12.5% of posted prices and
income tax at 55% of the tax reference price (posted price less production costs and royalty).
6. The private companies will buy back 13.75% of total production
under the formula for phase-in crude, at the price agreed upon in late
1972 (for light Arabian crude, tax-paid cost plus 35p/bbl). 13 We have
TABLE 2
Cost of Saudi Arabian Crude
(F.o.b. Ras Tanura, 340, $/Bbl.)
1-1-73
Posted price
Prod. cost
Royalty
Income Tax
Tax-paid cost
Additional cost of government owned
crude bought back
Freight to U.S. East Coast
Delivered cost to U.S. East
Coast, ex-duty

$2.591
.130
.324
1.175
1.629

4 -1_73

a

$2.773
.130
.346
1.263
1.739

Est. 1975
$3.014
.130
.377
1.379
1.886

Proj. 1980b
$3.847
.130
.481
1.780
2.391
.0 4 8 -c
.900d
3.339 e

a. Assumes average dollar devaluation of 9%.
b. Assumes average annual price increase of 5%.
c. Based on maximum amount of "phase-in" crude which private companies are obligated to
buy back.
d. The U.S. Maritime Administration gives a range of $.89-.95 per barrel (see note 14).
e. Figures of U.S. Gulf and West Coast are of similar order of magnitude.
Source of basic data: U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Oil and Gas, "Worldwide
Crude Oil Prices," Second Report, Summer 1972 (Technical Report P3-6-72),
Tables I and VIII.
12. The index of world export prices of manufactured goods, total, rose at an average rate of
slightly over 3% during the past decade but the increase accelerated since 1969 to about 7%. See
Economic Report of the President, Table C-93, 300 (Jan., 1973).
13. Petroleum Press Service, 4446 (Feb., 1973).
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allocated the additional cost of this crude over the total volume taken
by the private companies.
7. Transportation costs to the U.S. will approximate those calculated recently by the U.S. Maritime Administration. 1 4 The estimates
assume shipment of Eastern Hemisphere oil in foreign flag tankers of
250,000 DWT to terminals off the East Coast of the United States or
Canada with transshipment in smaller vessels to U.S. refineries. We
have stayed with the 1970 cost figures, rather than to assume
continuous cost escalation, as the Maritime Administration does, or a
dramatic downward shift in tanker costs, as the Oil Import Task
Force had assumed. 15
On this basis, the tax-paid cost of Arabian (340) crude in 1980, f.o.b.
Persian Gulf, would be about $2.39/bbl., and the adjusted cost,
including the cost of buy-back crude, about $2.44/bbl. Adding 90€
transportation costs gives a landed cost, ex-duty, of about $3.34 for an
average barrel.
No separate estimate has been made for the cost of imports from
Western Hemisphere sources. If economic forces were able to exert
themselves freely, their landed cost would approximate that of the
Middle East, where supplies are freely available in adequate volume.
Actually, because of security considerations, Canadian and Venezualan oil may be imported even if their cost is somewhat higher.
Thus, using the cost of Middle East oil as representative of all imports
may understate the cost of foreign oil from all sources. In view of the
prospective dominance of Eastern Hemisphere oil and the availability
of better data for that source, we have used the landed cost of Middle
East crude as representative of the cost of all U.S. oil imports. For
TABLE 3
Estimated Cost of U.S. Oil Imports in 1980
Volumes
Million
Source
Canada
Latin America
Eastern Hemisphere
Total

Costsa

barrels
p.d.

Million
barrels
p.a.

1.1
1.9
7.6

403
695
2,782

1.35
2.32
1.29

10.6

3,880

12.96

Billion
dollars
p.a.

a. At $3.339/bbl., as explained in the text. (Details of Middle East calculation in Table 2).

14. U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, The Economics of Deepwater
Terminals, Appendix 1(1972).
15. Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Controls, The Oil Import Question, Appendix E 247
(Feb., 1970).
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1980, based on the volumes shown in Table 1, the total cost of
imported oil amounts to $13 billion.
A number of simplifying assumptions should be pointed out. We
assume all shipments to be made at tax-paid cost, which implies that
they originate with U.S. companies or possibly state agencies. Imports
by companies of other nationalities would carry a somewhat higher
foreign currency content since the profit element would be transferred to third countries. Landed costs of crude from sources other
than the Middle East are assumed to be comparable to those of
Persian Gulf crudes. 16 No separate analysis has been made of possible
cost differences of importing residual fuel oil or other finished
products. If imports should include a large volume of products,
especially the lighter and more valuable ones like gasoline, the figures
would need to be adjusted upward somewhat. 17 Finally, we have not
included the cost of importing natural gas, by pipeline overland or by
tanker in liquid form, primarily because any major expansion of these
18
imports by 1980 is as yet uncertain.
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IMPLICATIONS
The estimated cost of U.S. oil imports of $13 billion in 1980 is
substantially smaller than an estimated $18 billion value of oil imports
for the same year, which corresponds to the $25 billion 1985
Department of Commerce figure cited earlier. Further, as we shall
explain below, even the $13 billion represents a considerable overstatement of the balance of payments impact of U.S. oil imports in
1980.
In this section we will concentrate on the balance of payments
costs associated with rising petroleum imports, emphasizing shipments from the Eastern Hemisphere. Rough estimates for Canada and
Latin America are made, but imports from Canada and Latin
America are both lower in volume and will grow at an appreciably
slower rate than those from the Eastern Hemisphere. In addition, cost
estimates for Canada and Latin America are more tenuous than those
for the Eastern Hemisphere, and a much higher proportion of
earnings of companies in Canada and Latin America are spent on U.S.
exports. Thus, balance of payments estimates for these two areas will
be both less reliable and less significant than estimates for the Eastern
Hemisphere, which is the focus for this study.
16. National Petroleum Council, supra note 3. The Council shows landed cost per barrel of
crude from other sources as ranging between $3.57 and $4.00/bbl. (p. 306). The figures,
however, are not comparable because of basic differences in assumptions from those made here.
17. The National Petroleum Council's estimate of the landed price of residual fuel oil in 1975
and subsequent years is $4.34/bbl. That of other products is $5.00.
18. The additional (gross) value of gas imports in 1980, based on N.P.C. volumes and prices
(3.75 trillion cubic feet at 82.5¢/MCF) is slightly over $3 billion.
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Balance of Payments Costs of Imports
A traditional approach to determining the balance of payments
impact of petroleum is to attempt to measure all payments and
receipts associated with these imports. These would include the cost
of petroleum imports plus capital exports associated with these
imports, offset by income on petroleum investments and U.S. exports
associated with petroleum production abroad. This approach starts
with a measurement of total (gross) payments on petroleum imports
and adds various adjustments for other financial transactions associated with these imports. Our approach differs somewhat from this
traditional one. By utilizing a concept of actual costs to the oil
companies handling the oil shipments, as developed in Table 2, we
have a measurement of the impact of U.S. oil imports on the U.S.
economy. Since the figures are based on costs, it is unnecessary to
estimate either profit margins or the complex sector of capital
transactions, except for new capital directly associated with expansion of production for U.S. imports.
The present approach has the advantages of conceptual simplicity
and reduced margin of error, since both earnings and capital
transactions can be notoriously unstable, and thus difficult to estimate.
For the purpose to which we use it here, i.e., determining the cost of
an incremental volume of oil shipments in a situation where the
resource is established and development costs tend to be both low and
stable, it provides results which are an acceptable approximation of
those obtained by the much more elaborate methods. Only one
adjustment is needed in order to compensate for growing capital
requirements under conditions of rising production and exports.
The other international payments element associated with the
import of oil is the cost of freight. All expenditures on freight are
assumed to be expenditures to foreigners leading to an outflow of
dollars. Thus, freight costs of 90 per barrel are balance of payments
expenditures.
The adjustment for capital movements arises because capital
exports from the United States, to the extent that they are required to
support higher levels of Eastern Hemisphere oil production, constitute balance of payments expenditures for the United States. Because
these expenditures are expected to be rising, they would not be fully
offset by depreciation and other writeoffs included in production costs
included in our cost figures. It is likely, at least in established
producing areas like the Middle East, that these expenditures will be
largely financed out of current earnings, and will not represent
completely new outflows of capital from the United States. However,
to the extent this is the case, they still would result in a reduction of

July 19731

UNITED STA TES OIL IMPORTS

retained earnings of U.S. branches, and thus reduce amounts remitted
back to the United States.
It is unlikely that the full impact of the expansion will fall on the
U.S. economy. Capital markets in Europe and Japan may furnish a
portion of the financing required for expanded Middle East facilities.
Also, with the host countries expected to attain substantial participation during the 1970's, they would at least indirectly finance some
portion of development programs out of their oil receipts. In any
event, the oil producing companies may be expected to try to hold the
drain on their parents' resources to a minimum.
We have assumed, somewhat arbitrarily, that one-third of the total
capital expenditures will result in net dollar payments by the United
States economy; one-third will be from non-U.S. sources, and onethird will represent exports of U.S. goods and services, which would
balance an equivalent capital out flow. If one accepts the Task Force
estimate of capital costs of $275 per daily barrel for the Middle
East, 19 then the balance of payments costs to the United States of
capital expenditures to increase exports of Eastern Hemisphere oil to
the U.S. from the 1970 level of .6 million barrels per day to the 1980
level of 7.6 million barrels per day will be $.64 billion for the entire
period. For 1980, we indicate an amount of $.06 billion, on the
assumption that the expansion will occur evenly over a decade. This
amount is so slight that it hardly warrants a revision of the cost of
Eastern Hemisphere oil imports of $9.3 billion in 1980 previously
established.
Induced Expenditures
The additional $9.3 billion accruing to Eastern Hemisphere countries for oil production and ocean freight is in part returned to the
United States in payment for goods and services. For the Middle East,
the Task Force estimated the proportion of this return flow in the
relatively short run at about 0.2. Over a longer period this was
estimated to increase to about one-third. 20 Using this latter figure,
because expenditures in any one year will reflect a cumulative
process, of the $9.3 billion expenditure on petroleum imports,
approximately $3.1 billion will be returned to the U.S. by purchases of
its exports. Thus, the net balance of payments cost to the United
States is $6.2 billion.
Some might consider it appropriate to consider expenditures on
U.S. exports by third countries which export goods and services to the
oil producing countries, experience rising incomes, and increase
19. The Oil Import Question, supra note 15, as Appendix H, 277.
20. Id., at 282, 288.
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expenditures on U.S. exports. There is considerable difficulty in
specifying the amounts and timing of such third party expenditures.
Also, the levels of these expenditures are highly dependent on changes
in levels of incomes and prices in these countries compared with the
U.S., and are determined more by balance of payments adjustment
processes than by any relationships which can be specifically related
to changing levels of petroleum exports.
Canadaand Venezuela
While this paper considers primarily the balance of payments
impact of petroleum imports from the Eastern Hemisphere, to keep
in perspective the overall dimensions of the problem rough estimates
have been made of the impact of U.S. petroleum imports from
Canada and Latin America. The principal adjustment that must be
made from the previous analysis is to recognize the higher capital
costs associated with expanding capacity in Canada, a much slower
rate of growth of petroleum exports from the Western Hemisphere,
and a much higher propensity to spend foreign exchange receipts in
the U.S. (approximately .5 for Venezuela and .7 for Canada).2 1 Using
the import volume of Table 3 and a delivered cost of $3.3339 per
barrel, the net annual balance of payments costs for imports from
these two countries would be almost $1.8 billion. From all sources,
the net balance of payments impact of U.S. petroleum imports would
be $8.0 billion.
Balance of Payments Adjustment
There is nothing inherent about the balance of payments impact of
a substantial increase in U.S. petroleum imports. This impact will
vary with the rate of increase of U.S. exports and other imports, and
with the overall U.S. balance of payments position, taking into
account all international transactions, including investment flows. It
would be possible, for example, for a more competitive U.S. economy
through expanding exports, import substitution, and rising foreign
investment income to generate the earnings required to pay for oil
imports. Any consideration of the balace of payments adjustment
process accompanying the higher level of petroleum imports, therefore, must be cautious and tentative.
Adjustment in the Current Account
While balance of payments adjustment involves all elements of the
international accounts, it may be helpful to focus initially on the
21. Id., at 282, 298.
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current account, which measures movements of goods and services,
and then on the capital account, which records capital flows.
A surplus or deficit position in the international balance of
payments is the net of the much larger flows of total trade in goods
and services. These, in turn, reflect output and prices in the U.S.
economy and the economies of all its trading partners. In 1971, for
example, with a GNP of $1047 billion, U.S. exports of merchandise
amounted to $43 billion, or 4% of total output. The balance on
current account (exports of goods and services minus imports of goods
and services) amounted to $0.7 billion, or 2% of exports and 1/10th of
1% of GNP. Given these magnitudes, it is not prudent to attempt to
specify the balance of payments adjustment implied by rising
petroleum imports. If the international position of the U.S. is weak
from other forces in 1980, petroleum imports could tend to undermine
further the value of the U.S. dollar. On the other hand, if the overall
U.S. position is one of strength, there is no reason for isolating
petroleum expenditures as posing a problem of balance of payments
adjustment.
Attention focused on an international energy balance, in fact, is not
very meaningful in economic terms. The concept, energy balance,
implies that there is a rationale to equating imports and exports of
energy commodities, and focuses on balance in the current account of
the balance of payments. Certainly such considerations are pertinent
to a discussion of national security aspects of importing oil. But based
on economic considerations, principles of comparative advantage
suggest that imbalance in trade of particular commodities is not only
likely but desirable. Availability and costs will determine the
composition of imports and exports; the meaningful question to be
answered is not whether a given volume of imports of oil (or any other
commodity) imposes intolerable costs on the U.S. economy; it is one
of the relative costs of such imports versus the relative costs of
alternative courses of action, such as accelerated development of
domestic energy sources, both considered in the broad economic
context of the total costs to the American economy and .to U.S.
consumers. In this light, if the relative cost of obtaining a resource or
product from domestic sources rises significantly, it may well be
appropriate for a country to import a larger proportion of this item
from abroad, and to pay for such imports with exports of other items
in which it continues to hold a comparative advantage to the same
country or third countries. Greater oil imports not only could, but
probably should, be financed by greater exports of agricultural
products, to mention one logical group of candidates.
Petroleum imports will constitute a larger proportion of total
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imports in 1980 than in 1971. If U.S. exports and imports grow at an
annual rate of 8%, as has been the case during most of the post-World
War II period, U.S. trade will approximate $85 billion in each
direction by 1980. At $13.0 billion, oil imports would be 16% of total
imports by that time; in 1971 the proportion was 6%. The principal
implication for the U.S. balance of payments is that a growing
segment of U.S. imports will be relatively price inelastic; thus imports
will be less responsive to balance of payments policies aimed at a
reduction in imports through more stable domestic prices or devaluation of the dollar relative to other currencies. In addition to the
price inelasticity consideration, it seems likely that the oil exporting
countries of the Eastern Hemisphere will continue to insist on pricing
and taxation arrangements which will compensate for any decline in
the exchange value of the dollar.2 2 A growing and major component
of U.S. imports will be relatively unresponsive to either commodity
price changes or exchange rate changes.
Overall, however, given the values projected by this study, it would
appear reasonable to expect that the current account of the U.S.
balance of payments can absorb and adjust to the rising level of
petroleum imports. The reforms of the international monetary system
currently being instituted and contemplated will further ease this
adjustment process by introducing more flexible exchange rates.
Adjustment can proceed, however, even with relatively fixed exchange rates, given the magnitudes and time period involved.
Adjustment in the CapitalAccount
One potential means of easing the burden on the U.S. economy
resulting from increased energy imports is for the oil exporting
countries to save a considerable proportion of their growing foreign
exchange receipts. The higher the resulting rate of saving, the less
the pressure on the current account of the U.S. balance of payments;
fewer goods and services need be exported to pay for petroleum
exports.
The precise magnitude of the future savings ratio in the major
Middle East oil exporting countries is difficult to predict. Export
expansion is likely to be concentrated in Saudi Arabia, the country
with the largest proved oil reserves, 2 3 and Iran, the most populated.
22. Middle East oil prices were increased by 8.49% in January, 1972, in the wake of the
devaluation of the U.S. dollar under the so-called "Geneva Agreement." A second increase,
reportedly about 9%, is scheduled to take effect in March 1973, following the dollar devaluation
and other currency adjustments of February.
23. Saudi Arabia and Iran are the only producing countries where both resource base and
policy appear to be conducive to major long-term expansion of production. In several others,
limited oil reserves or abundant financial liquidity have already led to limitations on production
increases.
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Because of its large absorptive capacity and ambitious development
plans, Iran is not likely to be confronted with embarrassing accumulations of foreign currencies in the forseeable future. To the contrary,
its growing demands for foreign exchange have generated pressures
for rapid expansion of oil production and exports. This is not the case
with Saudi Arabia, however. Even during the 1960's, prior to the
sharp increases in oil prices and government payments, that country
saved about 10% of its foreign exchange receipts.2 4 Given the rapid
expansion of income which will be earned from Saudi petroleum
exports, one might expect that the propensity to save would increase
considerably from the level of the past decade. It would be easy to
overestimate the rate, however. Saudi Arabia will become more
experienced in the planning and execution of development projects.
Petroleum income will continue to be used to subsidize the consumption of the general population. Given the resource base of Saudi
Arabia, it is quite appropriate for government petroleum income to
finance consumption through imports of goods and services. Oil
receipts in Saudi Arabia represent over 90% of government income,
and the government's budget increased by almost 25% this past fiscal
year. Thus, the increase in the rate of saving might be limited by
substantial increases in expenditures. But the rate of saving certainly
will increase over the next decade.
The critical question will then be how such countries as Saudi
Arabia will utilize their accumulated dollar balances. From a U.S.
balance of payments point of view, adjustment would be greatly
facilitated if a large portion of dollars not spent on current imports
were invested in long-term U.S. securities, or were directed into
private investment in the United States. The principal alternative,
channeling funds into the Eurodollar market and other security
markets in Europe and Japan, would contribute to the weakness of the
dollar. The experience of the past two years demonstrates that foreign
exchange holdings of Middle East countries can constitute an unstable
element in international financial markets. Any subsequent reorganization of the international monetary system must include provisions
for coping with currency movements of this type.
From this perspective, there appears to be a complementary
relationship between the prospective avialability of large investment
funds in the Middle East, on the one hand, and the need for large new
energy facilities (and the means of financing them) in the United
States, on the other. Whatever noneconomic reservations U.S. policy
makers may have over such partnerships, these must be evaluated in
the light of the likely alternatives. Apart from a huge overhang of
24. The Oil Import Question, supra note 15, at 283.
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additional Eurodollars there would appear only one other: the oil
would not be produced and thus would not be available to help
relieve the U.S. energy shortage.
CONCLUSION
In terms of the balance of payments of the United States, the
principal implication for the U.S. is that it must pay for imports of
resources worth $8.0 billion. This means that additional resources
must be exported from the U.S., that other imports must be reduced,
or that resources must be transferred to the U.S. in the form of
investments. If additional exports, import-substitution or capital
inflow are not forthcoming, the result will be an outflow of dollars
which will weaken the international value of tLe dollar.
The degree to which the U.S. is able to provide the necessary
resources for these purposes depends upon the competitiveness of the
U.S. economy relative to that of its major trading partners. Given the
relative weakness of the U.S. trade position over the past decade, it
would be easy to regard the $8.0 billion oil import bill with great
concern. However, one should not project ahead and presume
international economic conditions in 1980 will closely resemble those
of today. During the 1950's the international literature presumed that
the U.S. economy was sufficiently strong that international monetary
affairs would be characterized by dollar shortage, with other couniries not being able to obtain the dollars they desired for imports and
capital investment. This view was replaced rather quickly in the early
1960's by a concern with dollar glut, citing the outflow of dollars
accompanying U.S. balance of payments deficits. There is little reason
to believe that today we can look ahead eight years and anticipate the
balance of payments position of the U.S. any better than we have in
the past. A higher volume of petroleum imports will be only part of a
changing pattern of U.S. foreign trade, both in exports and imports.
Unless one can demonstrate that rising petroleum imports will not be
offset by favorable trade developments, there is no reason for
believing that these imports will pose an intolerable strain on the
value of the U.S. dollar. With a much larger GNP and a volume of
trade approximating $85 billion in each direction, it would seem to be
well within the capacity of the U.S. to adjust to the projected rise in
oil imports.
Many economists advocate that the best adjustment process is an
international monetary system of fluctuating exchange rates. Under
such a system, rising petroleum imports would tend to reduce the
international value of the dollar and help to stimulate U.S. exports
and make foreign goods more expensive to U.S. consumers. Recent
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reforms have introduced greater flexibility in exchange rates, although
it is still limited by concern in other countries for their own trading
position in such a system. To the extent that such degree of flexibility
is retained in the new international monetary system which may
emerge, it will facilitate adjustment of the U.S. payments position to
rising petroleum imports.
The emphasis of this paper has been on the costs of a substantial
increase in petroleum imports. A full assessment of the impact of
rising imports is possible only when the costs of alternative policies to
equate energy supply and demand is considered. The principal
alternative-development of domestic energy sources, probably at
significantly higher cost-will have balance of payments repercussions, too, because the resulting higher domestic prices for energy will
be reflected in the overall cost structure of U.S. industry. These costs
would be very difficult to estimate and translate into overall price
changes, but they, in turn, would have balance of payments consequences of some magnitude. However difficult they are to measure,
these costs must be recognized and compared with the costs of an
increased reliance on foreign oil. Rising petroleum imports will pose
problems of balance of payments adjustment, but the adjustment
process is not likely to be an unmanageable one.

